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On a New Bearing: The Re-organised Royal 
Australian Navy at War in Vietnam 
 
The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) made a modest but important commitment of a single 
destroyer to the Vietnam War on a rotational basis between March 1967 and September 1971. 
The contrast between the deployments of the American-designed and built Charles F. Adams 
class guided missile destroyers and the British-designed Daring class destroyer, HMAS 
Vendetta, represented the fruition of a small navy being pulled in two different directions. 
The RAN was undergoing a transitional period, which saw the service increasingly align with 
the United States Navy. This was a monumental shift in policy, as the Royal Navy had 
provided a model for the RAN to emulate since its creation in 1911. The Vietnam War 
offered a clear test of standardization and demonstrated that common ship designs provided a 
platform for interoperability, but did not guarantee it. The Australian ships were able to make 
a worthwhile contribution to a predominantly American naval effort, but they faced a number 
of challenges in achieving interoperability. The basis for successful co-operation was 
provided by the existence of common procedures and standardized equipment, but was 
necessarily supplemented by ad hoc measures and impromptu workarounds. 
 
 
The Australian Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Roy Dowling, wrote to the First Sea Lord, 
Lord Louis Mountbatten, in 1955: 
The time has arrived when we must decide where we shall acquire ships and 
weapons – UK or USA. In the past we have depended entirely on UK...We have 
also deliberately and consistently worked on the principle of complete 
interchangeability with the RN in all respects, including officers, men, ships, 
equipment and logistics generally. We now find ourselves at the crossroads 
solely because we very much doubt whether UK can provide us with what we 
want in the future. We have no wish to become Americans but there is a very 
 strong belief in this country that the sensible action for Australians is to acquire 
war equipment from the USA now.1 
 
In 1911, when the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) was created, the Australian Minister for 
Defence, Senator George Pearce, described it as a ‘navy within a navy’.2 By 1960, in a brief 
preceding the visit of Vice Admiral Henry Burrell, RAN, to investigate potential naval 
acquisitions, Britain’s Military Branch concluded:  
The Australians are very independent people. They will welcome Admiralty 
advice and assistance but will not tolerate ready-made ideas being thrust upon 
them...Our own ideas must be worked in obliquely and presented as being 
designed for the benefit of the R.A.N. not merely as a prop or an adjunct of the 
R.N. in the Far East.3  
 
Indeed, between the end of the Second World War and the onset of the Vietnam War, the 
RAN underwent significant changes, which reduced the influence of the Royal Navy (RN), 
but did not completely eradicate it. 
A British Naval Station was established in Australia in 1859 and the influence of the 
RN reverberated throughout the RAN into the 1960s and to a degree, continues up to the 
present day. Robert Hyslop has asserted that:  
The administrative tone and character of the [Australian] Naval Board was 
strongly British, simply tacked on to the Australian political fabric. To have a 
ready-made navy, Australia needed a ready-to-work naval administration and in 
1911 it was not possible to allow time for this administration to evolve out of 
local conditions and experience.4  
 
Although the administration and composition of the RAN was very much British in character, 
the Australians also gained practical experience of wartime operations working alongside the 
RN. During the first fifty years of its existence, the RAN reverted to RN control during the 
First World War, was initially placed on a war footing as a result of Britain’s Imperial War 
Telegram during the Second World War and also served within a Commonwealth command 
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 structure during the Korean War, Malayan Emergency and the Indonesian Confrontation.5 
Eric Grove has opined that ‘perhaps the RN and RAN have never been closer than they were 
in 1945’ and it is evident that the bonds remained intact throughout the beginnings of the 
Cold War.6 However, the period also witnessed the gradual decline of British influence in 
Asia, which prompted a shift in the RAN’s alignment from the RN to the United States Navy 
(USN). The RAN’s decision to purchase the American designed and built Charles F. Adams 
class destroyer as its new class of escorts in 1961 exemplified the RAN’s increasing 
alignment with the USN.  
 
A Change in Outlook 
 
The pivotal influence of the Second World War in shaping the development of the RAN is 
unambiguous. During the war, the RAN operated with distinction in the Mediterranean, 
returned to Australia to protect convoys and the home island and contributed to USN 
operations in the Southwest Pacific. James Goldrick has asserted that the RAN’s experiences 
during the Second World War ensured that the service ‘left its childhood and entered 
adolescence’.7 The necessity of operating together cohesively and effectively offered the 
RAN an opportunity to obtain a close-up look at USN tactics, techniques and procedures 
(TTPs). The lack of standardisation between the RN and USN during the Second World War 
also prompted the RAN to adopt American tactical signalling procedures in the course of 
operations with their allies. Although they reverted back to British standards after the war, the 
                                                 
5 In the shadow of war, RAN ships were placed under Admiralty control on 30 August 1939 but were to remain 
in Australian waters unless prior agreement was reached with the Australian government. The exception to the 
rule was the cruiser, HMAS Perth, which was operated alongside the RN in the West Indies. 
6 Grove, ‘British and Australian Naval Policy in the Korean War Era’, 246. 
7 Goldrick, ‘Australian Naval Policy’, 17. 
 extensive experience obtained while operating with the Americans would resonate with many 
future senior officers of the RAN.8  
Whilst the influence of the RN continued to permeate the RAN, the war necessitated 
that a thorough re-consideration of administration, equipment and outlook be conducted. 
Stephen Jurika, Jr., who became US Naval Attaché to Australia in 1947, recalled: 
The Australians…could see the decline of Great Britain, its decreasing interest in 
east Asia, its loss of its Indian empire, the obvious politicization and upcoming 
independence of all of southeast Asia…So they were looking toward the United 
States and they made, during my tenure as naval attaché, a number of overtures 
toward the United States, deliberate overtures, seeking accommodation, which 
ultimately resulted in the ANZUS pact.9  
 
The RAN made a clear decision to re-align its navy along the lines of the USN rather than be 
stymied by their traditional attachment to the RN, which was conveyed to both the Americans 
and the British. 
Following a meeting in 1955, Vice Admiral Sir Allan Scott-Moncrieff, Commander-in-
Chief, Far East Station (RN), revealed that the Australian Minister for Defence Production, 
Sir Eric Harrison was: 
perfectly candid and said that it appeared to them [the Australians] they should 
use the equipment of the people who would be fighting with them in war which, 
of course, would be the Americans as we would obviously pull out of Malaya as 
we had done the last time...In any case they know that in war the Americans will 
be their main protector and they will do everything they can to please the 
Americans and pin them down if possible.10 
Two years later, during a visit by an Australian mission to the Pentagon, Sir Percy C. 
Spender, Australian Ambassador to the United States, proclaimed: ‘The inevitable conclusion 
is that our destinies are intertwined – if war does break out, our forces will be engaged 
together. To wait until such a time would be foolhardy and tragic.’11 Despite the fabric of the 
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 RAN being so deeply engrained with RN traditions, the Australians had made a clear 
decision to change course and focus on the likelihood of working closely with the USN, 
which in turn, was deemed to require a change in the composition of the fleet and the 
practices of the navy. 
 
The Influence of Allies 
 
As a smaller navy, which was geographically distant from her traditional allies, the RAN’s 
desire to standardise with a larger partner was understandable. However, it was also essential 
that the larger navies wished to embrace the Australians. Given the longstanding link between 
the RAN and the RN, the British aspirations to see the Australians continue to develop their 
navy along similar lines was perhaps inevitable. That desire was also heightened by force 
reductions and mounting costs, which caused Britain’s First Sea Lord to conclude in 1960 
that the ‘the R.N. was scaled down to the lowest level at which a reasonably balanced Navy 
could be maintained and even lacked some equipments which could only be supplied through 
co-operation with Allied Navies’.12 British hopes stretched well beyond mere compatibility 
and the Director of Plans even went as far as to propose an ‘integrated Commonwealth 
(R.N./R.A.N./R.N.Z.N. [Royal New Zealand Navy]) Navy East of Suez’. The theory was 
that: 
each Navy should make a specialised contribution towards a balanced naval 
force. This would enable each of them to make the best use of its resources by 
avoiding the wasteful overheads that are at present incurred by each trying to 
provide itself with a balanced force; and in the result a bigger effective force 
would be produced from the same total resources.13  
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 Although it was recognised that a fully integrated Commonwealth fleet ‘may be at best a 
distant aim, or at worst unattainable in full measure’, it was believed that the ‘pursuit of 
progressively closer co-operation between these Navies is a realistic – perhaps the only 
realistic – policy’. The Military Branch deduced that although the Australian Minister for 
Defence had ‘laid emphasis on the need for Australian armed forces to be able to act 
independently and, insofar as the ability to co-operate with Allies was concerned, seemed to 
lean towards co-operation with the U.S. rather than with the U.K’, the ‘decisions actually 
taken by the Defence Minister – especially the decision to abolish the Australian F.A.A. 
[Fleet Air Arm] – seem to point the other way, at least so far as the R.A.N. is concerned’.14 
Despite British hopes, the RN was ultimately outflanked by the USN.  
 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Americans enacted a number of measures that 
were intended to stimulate standardisation between the armed forces of Australia and the 
United States. National Security Council Report 6109 (NSC 6109), issued on 16 January 
1961, furthered the notion that: 
the United States should continue to urge Australia progressively to standardize 
its military equipment using United States standards and continue to facilitate, as 
appropriate, the purchase by Australia of United States equipment for its own 
forces.15  
 
That sentiment built upon the collective defence arrangements: the ANZUS Treaty (1951); 
the Radford Collins Agreement (1951), which provided for naval cooperation between 
ANZAM (Australia, New Zealand and Malaya area) forces and Commander in Chief, US 
Pacific Command; the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (1955) and the Military 
Standardization Agreement (1960). When the possibility of Australia purchasing the Charles 
F. Adams class destroyers arose, Avery Peterson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far 
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 Eastern Economic Affairs, viewed it as an opportunity to correct an anomaly in 
standardisation between the armed forces of Australia and the United States:  
As I understand it, past progress in achieving a great degree of compatibility 
between the armed forces of Australia and the United States has been made 
primarily in the Australian Air Force and Army. Now it appears we have an 
opportunity to promote this program in the Australian Navy, which traditionally 
has had greater affinity for the United Kingdom.16 
 
Standardisation with the RAN was not merely an ideal eventuality for the Americans. Rather, 
it was a reality that the Americans worked tirelessly to enact.  
When the issue of providing credit to the Australians for the purchase of the 
American-built guided missile destroyers (DDGs) came under question, W. Averell 
Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State, contended that:  
We wish Australia to augment her armaments and to achieve greater weapons 
compatibility with the United States...In the final analysis our own self-interest 
should govern, and I submit that it is without doubt to our interest to add to our 
strength in Far Eastern waters in a manner that is completely standard with the 
United States Navy.17 
 
The decision to try to enact standardisation with the RAN was not simply a political decision 
and the USN actively encouraged both their political masters and Australian counterparts to 
facilitate the process. When Vice Admiral Burrell met with Admiral Arleigh Burke, the Chief 
of Naval Operations, to discuss the ‘possibilities for strengthening the Australian Navy with 
Untied States Navy vessels and equipment’, Admiral Burke made it clear that his position 
was ‘one of wholehearted support for fulfilling any Australian Navy need if at all possible’ 
and that he was ‘not agreeable to letting red tape and secondary considerations stand in the 
way of meeting these Australian needs if they can be met from existing United States Navy 
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 stocks of vessels and equipment’.18 The Australian willingness to purchase American-
designed and built equipment and the desire of the USN to enact standardisation with a 
reliable partner in the Pacific set in train a process, which would ultimately transform the 
RAN. 
 
Standardisation with the USN: Purchasing the DDGs 
 
The turn towards standardisation with the USN was both drawn out and multi-faceted. 
Perhaps no other decision better characterised the shift than the RAN’s selection of the 
American designed and built Charles F. Adams class destroyer as their new type of escort. 
The decision was reached for pragmatic financial and practical reasons but compatibility with 
the USN was also at the forefront of Australian thinking. The initial selection process was far 
from straightforward, although the options were considerably narrowed through consideration 
of likely coalition partners. Ultimately, the three realistic candidates were the RN’s 6,000 ton 
County class destroyer, the USN’s 3,400 ton Brooke class frigate or the another USN ship, 
the 4,500 ton Charles F. Adams class destroyer.19 The selection of the County class would 
have been a natural progression in view of the fact that the vast majority of the Australian 
fleet was British-designed, the RAN had predominantly operated under British tactical 
control during conflict and a large proportion of senior officers had undergone significant RN 
training.20 
Nevertheless, forecasts projected that the USN was a more likely and potentially even 
more reliable coalition partner for the RAN than the RN during any future contingencies. At a 
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 meeting at the Pentagon on 6 June 1956, the leader of the McBride Mission, the Minister for 
Defence, Sir Philip McBride, offered the following commitment to the Americans: 
we must direct our efforts toward closest association with our allies in all 
contingencies...I would like to stress with the greatest emphasis I can the 
importance of this decision that we have made; that is, that our forces should be 
equipped with modern equipment, standard or compatible with that of the U.S. 
forces because we recognize quite clearly in any of these contingencies that may 
occur we will obviously be playing our part in close association with your forces 
in that area.21 
The perceived likelihood of operating with the USN undoubtedly increased the appeal of the 
Charles F. Adams class destroyer.  
 There is no indication that the RAN was prepared to sacrifice quality for compatibility 
and it is perhaps telling that the USN ship was only selected after a rigorous inspection tour, 
which included visits to both Britain and the United States. The British pushed their own ship 
designs vigorously and concluded that Vice Admiral Burrell was ‘very much taken with the 
[HMS] Hampshire’, one of the County class guided missile destroyers.22 Although Burrell 
was able to appreciate the qualities of the County class, he did not feel that it could meet the 
RAN’s requirements without modification. The RN duly offered to examine the feasibility of 
modifying the County class but, in truth, there was some scepticism about the realism of the 
RAN’s ambition.23 
The armament of the ship was also a concern. The County class design included 4.5-
inch calibre guns and the Sea Slug surface-to-air missile system, neither of which were 
favoured by the Australians.24 Instead, the RAN indicated that they would prefer the 5”/54 
calibre guns and Tartar missile system, which were fitted to the Charles F. Adams class. 
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 After an investigation into the feasibility of incorporating those weapon systems in the 
County class design, the RN concluded that ‘the design effort required of the Admiralty 
would have caused an unacceptable delay of two to three years in the development of Royal 
Navy projects’.25 Consequently, the Australians decided that the Charles F. Adams class 
destroyer would be the most effective ship and the most suitable for their needs. 
 As with any major military acquisition, cost was also an important factor in the 
Australian selection process. The decision to purchase the American ships was smoothed by 
monetary considerations after the US agreed to finance the transaction through the Military 
Assistance Program in May 1961 and the National Advisory Council consented to waive any 
interest charges.26 The Australians made a formal proposal for credit for the outlay of $US 90 
million, which was based on a cost $US 45 million for each of the two ships that were to be 
ordered, in view of the fact that the cost was so substantial relative to their defence budget 
that the payments needed to be spread over an extended period.27 As a result, the Australians 
were only required to make an immediate payment of just $US 1.5 million, with the 
remainder being paid over an eight year period.28 Subsequently, it was announced on 29 June 
1961 that the RAN had selected the Charles F. Adams class ships as its next generation of 
destroyers. 
 When the RAN mooted the possibility of purchasing a third Charles F. Adams class 
destroyer, Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, indicated that the US was willing to 
provide credit, without interest, as long as ‘the Australian payment schedule met the Navy’s 
required progress payments, or if the Australians were ready to pay in equal instalments over 
a period of seven years’, otherwise interest would be charged at a commercial rate of 4.5 
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 percent on any difference between the Australian payments and the required progress 
payments to the USN.29 On 19 February 1963, Senator John Gorton, the Minister for the 
Navy, indicated that Australia would agree to the annual repayment plan for the costs of the 
basic vessel.30 Consequently, ‘in order to promote foreign policy and national security 
objectives’, the US provided a seven-year credit to the Government of Australia in the 
amount of $37,632,000 to facilitate the purchase of a third DDG under the terms of the 
Foreign Assistance Act (1961).31 A further credit of $US 7.6 million for armaments, 
ammunition, and spares was the subject of a separate purchase.32 
In considering acquisition options for a fourth destroyer, the RAN examined the 
capabilities of the County class, the RN’s Type 52 and the Charles F. Adams class. The 
submission for Cabinet concluded: 
Logistic considerations further emphasise the desirability of the CHARLES F. 
ADAMS class as the choice for a new comprehensive escort for the RAN. The large 
number of this class in service with the USN makes it a reasonable expectation that the 
logistic requirements for the ships in our forward area of interest will be met in the 
foreseeable future. In the Australia area, the base spares, training equipment and 
practice and support facilities which are already provided for three D.D.G.’s will 
provide basically for the fourth.33 
 
Financial concerns ultimately militated against the acquisition of a fourth destroyer, with 
Cabinet rejecting the proposal for a further purchase in 1965. Even so, the reasoning behind 
the RAN’s decision indicated that the move towards American designs was becoming 
increasingly instinctive. 
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  Whilst the Australians were satisfied with their purchases and eagerly awaited their 
arrival, the US was equally pleased with the transactions. The purchase of the DDGs, as well 
as other military technology, including the F-111 aircraft, prompted Edward Clark, the 
American Ambassador to Australia, to declare in 1966 that Australia had ‘been most 
cooperative with us in the field of procurement, against rather strong competition and 
political pressure from the British’.34 In justifying the sale, Roger Hilsman, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, stated:  
It is understood that the Australian Government’s desire to obtain the vessel 
stems from a well conceived extant program to create a modern missile-age navy 
tailored to the requirements of Pacific defense and capable of operating in close 
conjunction with the United States Navy. The ability of the Royal Australian 
Navy to utilize the vessel effectively and to fulfil the objectives of its 
modernization is beyond question.35 
Put simply, the Americans were ‘gratified from a military point of view in having more ships 
of the same general class in being in the world in the hands of allies’.36 The acquisition 
decision was based, in part, on the likelihood of the RAN and USN operating in partnership 
in the future. That opportunity would arise sooner than either navy may have expected. 
 
Testing the Theory: The RAN at War in Vietnam 
 
Despite the perceived success of the acquisition, the first real test of the effectiveness of 
standardisation between the RAN and USN was initiated by Australia’s involvement in the 
Vietnam War.  In order to supplement the USN, the RAN made a modest but important 
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 commitment of a single destroyer on a rotational basis between March 1967 and September 
1971. Although not as diverse as the Second World War, the RAN undertook a wide range of 
missions during the Vietnam War. RAN ships patrolled off the coast of North Vietnam, took 
part in interdiction missions, provided naval gunfire support (NGS) in South Vietnam and 
even contributed to in-country river operations on occasion. RAN destroyers also 
intermittently formed part of the aircraft carrier screen at Yankee Station.37 In total, 
Australian ships steamed 397,000 miles and fired 102,000 rounds. The contribution of the 
RAN was numerically minor but in addition to the political value of Australian involvement, 
the ships were able to make a worthwhile contribution to the naval effort.  
 In particular, RAN ships achieved distinction through their contribution to the NGS 
effort. The provision of NGS by the RAN and USN to forces operating ashore was a 
continuous feature across all four Corps Tactical Zones during the Vietnam War. Vietnam’s 
long coastline, which stretched for approximately 1,200 miles, and the numerous significant 
strategic areas that were located in coastal enclaves, made naval gunfire an extremely useful 
commodity.38 
 Naturally, the DDGs were the RAN’s first choice when it came to deciding which 
ships would be deployed to Vietnam. HMAS Hobart and HMAS Perth deployed to Vietnam 
on three occasions, while HMAS Brisbane undertook two tours. The requirement to maintain 
continuous deployments of ships to Vietnam exposed the RAN’s limited collection of three 
DDGs. The problem came to the fore when Brisbane was due to be relieved in September 
1969. As Perth was scheduled for a refit and Hobart was committed to other duties, the RAN 
was compelled to deploy a British-designed ship to Vietnam. The deployment of a non-US 
designed ship to an American operation created serious concerns within Australia, which 
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 prompted an investigative team to be deployed to Subic Bay. Following exploratory meetings 
with the USN, the Minister for the Navy, Bert Kelly, received assurances that logistic support 
for a Daring class destroyer was ‘merely a problem to overcome’.39 Consequently, HMAS 
Vendetta was nominated for service in Vietnamese waters and served with the USN between 
September 1969 and March 1970. The decision also had the added benefit of helping to 
maintain morale. Senior RAN figures were conscious of an emerging sentiment within the 
navy that ‘only the DDGs were considered as first eleven ships’ and deployment of a British 
type ship was seen as a way to address the problem.40 
 The DDGs were new ships that were fitted with the latest technology but perhaps 
more importantly, the Charles F. Adams class was in service with the USN and ships of that 
type were being operated in Vietnam, which made them a natural fit. The ship’s two 5-inch 
automatic rapid fire guns offered sufficient range to make them extremely useful for Sea 
Dragon operations off the coast of North Vietnam.41 In contrast, as a Daring class destroyer, 
HMAS Vendetta was an older generation of ship and varied significantly from the ships that 
were being operated by the USN in Vietnam. Nevertheless, the capacity of Vendetta’s six 
4.5-inch guns to fire up to one hundred rounds per minute in good conditions made her a 
valuable asset when NGS was required.42 In total, during the RAN commitment to Vietnam, 
the destroyers fired approximately 80,000 5”/54 and 6,800 4.5” rounds at a daily average of 
115 rounds per day.43 While the impact of the RAN’s contribution to the overall war effort 
was understandably limited, as indeed were naval operations in general when the outcome of 
the war is considered, the influence of the Vietnam experience on the service was significant. 
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 The RAN’s involvement in the Vietnam War provided the testing ground for both new 
procedures and equipment.  
 Whilst working knowledge of an American ship was an inevitable by-product of the 
decision to purchase the Charles F. Adams class destroyers, the re-equipping process also 
afforded the Australians an opportunity to acquire an understanding of USN TTPs. Before the 
ships were in service with the RAN, specialist teams that would form part of the 
commissioning crews were dispatched to United States, where they underwent extensive 
training alongside their USN counterparts in order to become accustomed ‘with new design 
characteristics, new conditions of habitability, new weapons systems and, new capabilities’.44 
 Even those crew members who did not undergo specialist training were familiarised 
with the USN’s way of conducting business. RAN work-ups were tailored to ensure that 
Australian DDGs undertook similar shake-downs and trials to those performed by sister ships 
in service with the USN. Captain Guy Griffiths, Commanding Officer of Hobart during her 
first tour to Vietnam, explained that: 
it was assessed as most important to subject the ship and her company to the full 
USN schedule for shake-down as fixed by the Fleet Training Group, in order to 
gain a very close understanding of USN drills, operations and procedures in this 
US designed destroyer.45  
 
The shake-down and work-up periods included dealing with aerial, surface and sub-surface 
threats. NGS training was a prerequisite and the exercises were conducted with the assistance 
of United States Army and United States Marine Corps spotters in order to introduce the gun 
crews to US practices.46 The shake-down and work-up programmes also devoted significant 
time to addressing communications, logistics and maintenance issues. 
As a Daring class, Vendetta was subjected to a modified programme, which reflected 
the difficulties of dispatching a single, non-standardised ship to Vietnam. Vendetta’s 
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 programme necessarily included practical training to familiarise the ship’s company with the 
various work-arounds that were required for the vessel’s deployment such as the specially 
installed probe refuelling equipment.47 RAN crews became accustomed to the modifications 
without any significant difficulties during the work-up period. Whilst the scale was obviously 
not as large as for Vendetta, all RAN crews, even those of the DDGs, had to become 
accustomed to new equipment for service with the Seventh Fleet. The Australian crews were 
not the only benefactors of the work-up period, as the Americans were able to use the process 
to gauge the capability of the Daring class destroyer and assess her likely utility in Vietnam.  
It is notable that each RAN commanding officer explicitly recognised the value of 
working-up with elements of the American military.48 Captain Griffiths recorded:  
I was also pleased with the sound degree of understanding in the ship of USN 
procedures which had begun with trials and shakedown. There was resultant 
potential for a close degree of operational integration to be achieved with the 
RAN crew in an American-designed DDG.49  
 
The work-up process also provided RAN crews with an insight into likely operations in 
Vietnam. In addition to the traditional workup, as dictated by Australian Fleet General 
Orders, RAN ships engaged in a pre-deployment exercise in Australia known as CHE 
SARA.50 The involvement of an experienced officer from Sub-Unit One, 1st ANGLICO (Air 
Naval Gunfire Liaison Company), at the RAN’s request, added an air of realism and ensured 
that Australian procedures were compatible with those used by the Americans.51  
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 RAN ships continued their preparations with a short period of type training with the 
USN at Subic Bay prior to the commencement of operations.52 At Subic, RAN crews were 
subjected to a series of informative lectures and briefings on various topics, including 
Seventh Fleet organisation, logistic and administrative support and the nature of operations in 
Vietnam. Under the terms of the ‘Logistic and Administrative Supplement to Military 
Working Agreement’ RAN units were afforded access to the ‘training facilities, equipment, 
and aids’ that were available to USN ships.53 Access to Tabones Range, near Subic Bay, 
allowed RAN crews to practise the provision of NGS in accordance with USN TTPs and to 
experiment with extended range procedures, which was a regular requirement in Vietnam.54 
The physical structure of the ships was merely the platform for co-operation and it proved 
invaluable for the RAN to work on advancing interoperability with the USN, both before the 
ships deployed and once they arrived in theatre.  
 Although standardisation of platforms was achieved through the RAN’s acquisition of 
the Charles F. Adams class ships, a number of work-arounds were still required for 
integration into the Seventh Fleet and operations in Vietnam. The work-arounds included 
both the introduction of new equipment and minor modifications to existing equipment. For 
example, in order to transfer missiles at sea, a modified housefall rig and stops were welded 
to the guide tracks of Perth to prevent unwanted movement on board the ship.55 For the 
DDGs, few modifications were required and those that were installed were largely 
insignificant. The same cannot be said for the British-pattern Daring class destroyer, which 
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 required further changes. Extensive arrangements, code named ‘Plan Familiar’, were put into 
place prior to the departure of the ship, which resulted in major modifications in order to aid 
interoperability with the Seventh Fleet.56 
 The Americans also had to make preparations to receive Vendetta in theatre. The 
Australian Commonwealth Naval Board (ACNB) requested that the Commander-in-Chief, 
Pacific Command (CINCPAC) authorise USN support and logistic arrangements to provide 
essential facilities for the operation of Vendetta in Vietnam. As a result, the Americans 
provided storage and disposition on station for Australian 4.5” ammunition, storage space at 
Subic Bay for RAN stores, maintenance support at Ship Repair Facility (SRF) Subic and the 
supply of special equipment from the Seventh Fleet pool.57 Vendetta was a novelty for SRF 
staff and the RAN was required to furnish the USN with complete sets of drawings, 
handbooks, docking plans, spare parts allowance lists and Weapons Maintenance schedules.58 
In order to accommodate Vendetta’s use of atypical ammunition, the Navy Office 
commissioned the design and production of ammunition pallets to house 4.5” shells on board 
US supply ships for the purpose of replenishment at sea. 
 The concurrent utilisation of the Charles F. Adams class destroyers enabled the two 
navies to develop common procedures for maintenance and repairs. Based on American 
experiences of barrel wear in Vietnam, the RAN reconsidered their procedure for re-gunning, 
which resulted in the acceptance of a common process for both navies. Whilst equipment 
standardisation in peacetime offers the prospect for interoperability in warfare, it is not a 
foregone conclusion. It was active cooperation between the RAN and USN in relation to the 
common equipment, which resulted in such a high standard of interoperability.  
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In view of the shortage of USN ships available for deployment to Vietnam, the 
interchangeability provided by RAN DDGs and the modifications undertaken to Vendetta 
under ‘Plan Familiar’ allowed Australian ships to help rectify the shortfalls. In particular, the 
Seventh Fleet often found itself short of 5”/54 ships, which made the RAN DDGs especially 
valuable and in the absence of other ships of that variety, made ground units dependent on 
RAN ships on occasion, particularly when they were in need of extended range capability.59 
According to a Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) assessment, ‘the diversity 
of ships, guns, and ammunition used in providing NGFS offers considerable flexibility, both 
to the gunline and ground commanders’.60 By the end of 1970, DDGs accounted for 10% of 
NGS missions and only 11% of the rounds expended during those firings. Whilst the number 
of firings was limited, the ships were essential for extended range shoots when cruisers or 
battleships were unavailable. Tellingly, DDGs were responsible for 34.2% of Sea Dragon 
missions, which often required an extended range capability.61 Limitations of particular types 
of ships in Vietnam meant that the RAN’s limited commitment of a single DDG proved to be 
valuable beyond the Australian’s meagre numeric contribution.  
 The utility of simultaneously maintaining a range of different ship capabilities on 
station was revealed during both of Brisbane’s deployments to Vietnam.  Intermittently in 
1971, the ship was limited to undertaking missions outside the range of 5”/38 ships due to 
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 difficulties with barrel wear and problems with 5”/54 ammunition.62 In contrast, during an 
earlier deployment in 1969, when ships equipped with 5”/38 mounts encountered problems 
with ammunition, Brisbane was placed on standby to assume responsibility for the lion’s 
share of NGS missions.63 
 At the same time, it should be noted that standardisation was also marked by an 
inherent difficulty. Operating the same ships and equipment inevitably made RAN units 
susceptible to the problems that were experienced by their USN counterparts, which had 
knock-on effects for the provision of NGS in Vietnam. Most notably, batches of defective 
equipment and malfunctioning communication technology hampered the performance of 
vessels from both navies. The quality of 5”/54 cartridges was a constant concern throughout 
the campaign but never more so than when all firings of that particular type of ammunition 
were suspended in April 1967. As Hobart was the only RAN vessel in theatre, Australian 
involvement in offensive naval operations was effectively halted, albeit temporarily. 
Interestingly, it was somewhat fortunate that at the peak of the problems with the 5”/54 
ammunition, Vendetta was the RAN ship deployed to Vietnam and was able to maximise the 
use of her 4.5” ammunition.64 The RAN’s reliance on the USN for logistic support to the 
DDGs ensured that the availability and effectiveness of RAN units were occasionally beyond 
Australian control.  
 
The Gap Between Standardisation and Interoperability: The Operational 
Challenges of the Vietnam War 
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 Although the desire to standardise the navies was based on the rational logic of future co-
operation, the actual requirements of operating together had been insufficiently considered, 
which meant a number of challenges had to be addressed during the Vietnam War. An 
essential element of coalition naval operations, or any military operation for that matter, is the 
ability of different units to communicate effectively. The incorporation of an RAN ship into 
the American organisation necessitated immediate and decisive action. Following 
confirmation that Hobart would be deploying to Vietnam, CINCPAC decreed that: 
HMAS HOBART will participate in SEVENTHFLT operations on same basis as 
US Navy destroyers assigned and will have need to know essentially same 
information as other destroyer types performing similar functions. It is not 
desired that operational and administrative type traffic be designated NOFORN 
simply because HOBART has joined the team.65  
 
As was the case for all USN ships, RAN units received track messages from the unit 
commander.66 Access to USN communications was not unfettered and the RAN was only 
provided access to American communications that were deemed as ‘need to know’ for 
operational purposes. In order to facilitate the prompt exchange of information, the 
classification ‘NOFORN EXCEPT AUSTRALIA’ was introduced to classify material that 
was deemed to be releasable to Australia.67 
 Following authorisation by the USN’s Chief of Naval Operations, Hobart was 
authorised to copy two channels of the US Navy Fleet Radioteletype Broadcast in the 
Western Pacific, which contained most of the communications traffic that was classified as 
secret and below.68 As a result, RAN destroyers were provided with VHF transceivers and 
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 additional temporary communication fits.69 The Vietnam War proved that compatible 
equipment can be redundant if operational security prohibits connectivity. Although the RAN 
and USN were operating standardised platforms, the communications fit of the ships differed 
and American assistance was required to overcome the incompatibilities.  
Logistic considerations were also a major concern prior to the commitment of RAN 
destroyers to Vietnam, which necessitated the production of the ‘Logistic and Administrative 
Supplement to Military Working Agreement’. The agreement was signed by Chief of Naval 
Staff, Royal Australian Navy (CHNAVSTAFFRAN) and Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet 
(CINCPACFLT) on 1 March 1967. Under the agreement, CINCPACFLT was responsible for 
logistic support of RAN destroyers placed under American control on the same basis as the 
equivalent USN forces. The agreement stated:  
RAN units so allocated will be fitted, manned, and equipped initially in 
accordance with applicable policy and directives subject to such modifications as 
both CHNAVSTAFFRAN and CINCPACFLT subsequently deem necessary to 
accomplish those missions actually assigned. Such modifications to fitting and 
equipment, including any resultant equipment additions, will be accomplished 
from CINCPACFLT resources on either a temporary or permanent basis, as 
appropriate.70 
The Australian Government would reimburse the United States Government for the support 
provided by the USN, as stipulated by a pre-existing reciprocal agreement between the two 
nations.71 The Australians were responsible for the provision of items that were unique to the 
RAN. 
 For those items that could not be delivered out at sea, the RAN was able to utilise 
shore-based replenishments but for all other things, the RAN received underway 
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 replenishment of ammunition, fuel, food and other essential items from Squadron Three of the 
Service Force, US Pacific Fleet (SERVPAC), the Seventh Fleet’s Mobile Logistic Support. 
The integration of RAN ships into the USN logistic network was a relatively straightforward 
process. Brisbane’s commanding officer, Captain A. Willis, declared: ‘few problems have 
been experienced in switching to the U.S. Navy Supply Systems again. In fact, with U.S. 
Navy Type Allowance Lists, the ship’s Naval Stores sailors feel very much at home in the 
U.S. Navy Supply environment.’72  
The commanding officers of Australian ships were all quick to commend the scope 
and efficiency of the logistic support provided by the Seventh Fleet. Captain Ian Burnside, the 
Commanding Officer of Perth, was full of praise for the American logistic network: ‘In our 
deployment I can only say that the USN logistic effort was indeed superb...If you wanted it 
and had the budget – you got it!’73 For the DDGs, the utility of the system undoubtedly 
resulted from the build-up of essential ammunition and spares for the Charles F. Adams class 
destroyer. Therefore, when Perth was re-assigned without warning to Northern I Corps on 29 
September 1967, the ship was able to rendezvous with USS Castor twenty-four hours early 
and even managed to acquire the necessary spare parts to repair the AN/SPS52 radar.74  
Despite broad compatibility with the USN, even the DDGs required minor 
modifications in order to receive logistic support from the Americans, including magazine 
whips, davits and ammunitions corrals. However, the announcement in October 1967 that 
Perth topped the entire Seventh Fleet in ‘Order of Excellence at UNREPS [underway 
replenishments]’ demonstrated that the integration of RAN DDGs into the Seventh Fleet 
logistic network was achieved with relative ease.75 Whilst the modifications to the DDGs 
were an inconvenience, the deployment of the British-designed Vendetta was problematic. 
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 The services of HMAS Jeparit were required to transport ammunition for Vendetta’s 4.5” 
guns from Australia to Subic Bay. That transportation required advanced preparation, as the 
ammunition needed to be stored in USN-type pallets to facilitate stowage in American 
ammunition ships. Modifications were also required to the ship itself, which resulted in 
modified ‘housefall’ kingposts being fitted fore and aft to make the vessel compatible with 
USN logistics ships. In addition, four probe fuelling points were installed to foster rapid 
fuelling.76 The logistic difficulties created by the deployment of Vendetta were challenging 
but not insurmountable. Innovative work-arounds and the can-do attitude of both navies 
smoothed the integration of a non-US designed ship into the Seventh Fleet. The transition 
was far from seamless but it was successful. 
Integration with the Seventh Fleet also provided RAN ships with access to USN 
SRFs. The completion of mid-deployment upkeep processes for RAN ships was conducted at 
USN SRF due to their ‘ability to handle successfully a large work list in a relatively short 
time’.77 The process for the RAN’s Charles F. Adams class destroyers was seamless because 
the SRF had a working knowledge of the ship. Vendetta proved to be more of a challenge but 
the necessary support was provided by the facilities. On countless occasions, the repair 
facilities responded rapidly to immediate maintenance requests by RAN destroyers, which 
ultimately minimised the length of time that ships were required to be away from the 
gunline.78 Assistance from the Mobile Technical Unit (MOTU), a subsidiary of SRF Subic, 
provided prompt and effective technical support, which enabled RAN units to rectify defects 
without leaving station. Similarly, USN accident investigation teams drew on their 
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 knowledge and experience of American DDGs in the Seventh Fleet to provide advice and 
assistance to RAN ships.79 In the case of the DDGs, it was fortunate that faulty or damaged 
equipment could be replaced through cannibalising the required part from a USN ship that 
was not required for immediate action.   
Integration into the Seventh Fleet also afforded RAN crews direct contact with a 
series of technical representatives from many of the companies that manufactured the 
equipment onboard the DDGs. Guidance was regularly sought from representatives of the 
manufacturers when faults recurred or proved to be beyond the capability of the USN and 
RAN crews. In operating equipment that was standardised with the USN, the RAN benefitted 
from advice about a diverse range of equipment, including communication, electric and 
weapons technology, which helped to uphold the RAN’s reputation for keeping ships in an 
operational state.80 
The USN logistic system was impressive but far from flawless. After experiencing 
problems with the ship’s 5”/54 gun, Captain Peter Doyle, Commanding Officer of Perth 
during her first deployment, complained that ‘diagnosis of the defects is usually rapid, but 
gaining access to the defective items is often a very lengthy process’.81 On a few occasions, 
RAN ships were required to wait extended periods, which could stretch to months, before 
they received the requested spares.82 It was also true that the Australian logistic system was 
plagued by a combination of shortages and delays. Captain Burnside recalled: 
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 With regard to items not on the USN inventory, or which were outside normal 
USN coverage, we had to rely on Australian supplies. Here we did have 
problems, particularly when they had to come through Manila or Saigon. In the 
case of Manila we did not always have good support from the Embassy staff and, 
with Saigon, the marathon of their customs procedures was often impossible to 
master.83  
The Australians received commendable logistic support from the USN in the main, but that 
dependency created an over-reliance on American support. Australian complacency 
ultimately resulted in an inability to bridge the gap between the requirements of RAN ships 
and the capacity of the Americans to provide the requisite support. It was fortunate that, on 
the whole, USN logistic support was offered without reservation and was generally sufficient 
to allow the RAN to operate effectively. 
 Tellingly, the RAN also enacted significant and symbolic changes to its structure, 
which, in part, reflected the influence of working alongside the Seventh Fleet. On 10 May 
1968, the ACNB discontinued the use of Royal Navy squadron numbers and adopted a 
similar system to their American counterparts. Consequently, the RAN’s three DDGs formed 
the 1st Australian Destroyer Squadron and the three Daring class destroyers comprised the 2nd 
Australian Destroyer Squadron. The move was accompanied by the introduction of the USN 
system of hull numbering and the policy of labelling ships by their type and number.84 Peter 
Jones has cautioned that ‘the RAN did not adopt USN practices wholesale but rather 
modified those appropriate to suit the RAN’s British derived organisation’.85 Far from 
becoming an appendage of the USN, the changes merely represented a reduction of the 
British influence on the organisation of the RAN. Perhaps the most symbolic move was the 
RAN’s introduction of the Australian White Ensign in place of the British White Ensign. The 
structural changes that were enacted by the ACNB went some way to smoothing the 
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 integration of RAN units into the Seventh Fleet during the Vietnam conflict and also helped 
to facilitate later naval cooperation between the two nations.  
 
The Lessons of the RAN’s Experience 
 
Although the two obvious markers for the RAN’s transition to standardisation with the USN 
were the decision to purchase the DDGs and their commitment to Vietnam, the intervening 
period was at least as important. Interoperability at the operational and tactical level does not 
occur through a process of osmosis simply as a result of purchasing the same platform. 
Indeed, the extensive effort exerted by both the RAN and USN to achieve compatibility in all 
areas, from logistics to training prior to the Australian naval commitment to Vietnam, was 
essential. Even then, specific operational requirements for action alongside the USN during 
the Vietnam War necessitated the addition of some new equipment and the modification of 
existing equipment and procedures. In the case of the DDGs, interoperability was achieved 
with minimal fuss. HMAS Vendetta posed additional problems but endeavour and goodwill 
by both parties facilitated efficient cooperation during the Vietnam War. Although it is 
impossible to say with any certainty, it would appear that if the RAN had deployed more than 
one Daring class destroyer at any given time or deployed multiple Daring’s consecutively, 
then the logistics problems would have been more cumbersome and perhaps even prohibitive. 
In actuality, the deployment of a single Daring ensured that the allowances made by the 
Seventh Fleet and the efforts of American personnel to obtain a detailed working knowledge 
of equipment specific to the Australians allowed impromptu work-arounds to prove to be 
sufficient to maintain a reasonable level of interoperability. 
It should be noted that the RAN’s acquisition of the DDGs was not without 
drawbacks. Jones has surmised that the purchase of the DDGs led to the cessation of 
 destroyer construction in Australia, expanded the range of foreign weapon systems in use 
with the RAN and necessitated the creation of an additional logistic support system that 
inevitably increased operating costs.86 The decision to purchase American-designed DDGs 
created a further short-term problem, which was also experienced by other navies that 
underwent a similar change in their acquisition policy. In reference to the development of the 
Indian Navy, G.M. Hiranandani, has declared that although ‘the transition from British to 
Russian acquisitions did manage to succeed,’ it did so ‘slowly and tortuously to begin with’.87 
The RAN’s experience mirrored that of the Indians in terms of temporarily creating a two-tier 
navy.88 Jones has outlined:  
On one side were the DDGs known as the “tupperware ships” with their crews 
conversant only in USN procedures but also the considerable jargon needed to 
crew a US-built ship. On the other side was the rest of the Fleet or the “steel 
ships”. It would be wrong to overemphasise this split, but it was evident.89  
 
Although these difficulties do not detract from the success of integrating with the USN during 
the Vietnam War, they do clearly indicate that significant divergences in acquisition policy 
predictably create teething problems. 
 While smaller navies will inevitably strive for independence, there are also 
widespread benefits to emulating the model of effective larger navies. Tom Frame has 
contended:  
Although the RAN had been created by royal decree in 1911, its customs, 
traditions and ethos were those of the parent navy from which it had been 
grafted. In the RAN’s formative years, replicating the most powerful navy in the 
world made good sense. In British eyes, Australian success would be determined 
by the faithfulness of the copy.90  
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 In addition to the RAN, the development of other navies in the post-Second World War 
period has demonstrated that compatibility and interoperability with likely coalition partners 
are often goals that growing navies strive for during their development. 
For junior partners, as evidenced by the RAN’s involvement in the Vietnam War, 
interoperability takes on an increasing importance when only limited contributions to 
multinational operational areas can be made in order to ensure that the commitments are more 
beneficial than they are a hindrance. Financial considerations, among a number of other 
practical difficulties, will often prevent smaller navies from standardising platforms with 
larger navies, particularly across their entire fleets. The RAN’s experience in Vietnam proved 
that ship-designs are merely enablers rather than creators of interoperability. Just as 
important, if not more so, is the facilitation of compatibility in culture, mindset, training, and 
ideally TTPs. The deployment of the British-designed HMAS Vendetta to Vietnam 
demonstrated that the incorporation of a non-standardised vessel into another nation’s fleet 
will inevitably create a range of difficulties, but they can be overcome through a shared 
understanding. 
There can be no doubt that the purchase of the Charles F. Adams class destroyers was 
a watershed moment for the RAN. Although the RN and USN had actively tried to promote 
standardisation with the RAN, the purchase of American designed and built ships delineated 
between a navy moulded on the British model and an increasingly independent service aimed 
at compatibility with the US. Indeed, while the RAN actively sought greater independence, 
the Australians were cognisant that future operations, both within their own region and 
beyond, were likely to be undertaken in partnership with the USN. Arguably, the Australians 
were vindicated by the fact the DDGs saw service with the USN in Vietnam and HMAS 
Brisbane went on to serve alongside the USN during the Gulf War. 
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